An Exercise in Overkill

For many American companies in the arms business, it was a dark day when the Pentagon released its new budget request early this year. Billions of dollars' worth of major weapons programs were cancelled and, from the grumbling on Capitol Hill, it seemed clear that further cuts were to come. But for one defense contractor, Lockheed Aeronautical Systems, the news from the Pentagon could hardly have been better: the new Air Force Advanced Tactical Fighter, Lockheed's F-22, emerged unscathed from the latest belt-tightening. Despite the end of the Cold War, plans to buy 648 of these ultra-high-tech aircraft are going ahead.

The F-22 was unveiled amid much fanfare in April 1991, beating Northrop's alternative after a fierce five-year design competition. In announcing their choice, Air Force officials hailed the Lockheed plane as a technological marvel. A powerful engine enables it to cruise at well above the speed of sound without the need of inefficient afterburners, which other fighters use to inject fuel into the hot gases emitted from the jet turbines to generate more thrust. Its maneuverability, the key to winning aerial dogfights, is said to be phenomenal. It can fly farther and is easier to maintain than the world's best current fighter aircraft, the F-I5. Furthermore, the F-22 is reputedly as invisible to radar as the F-117, the stealth fighter-bomber that performed so spectacularly in the Gulf War last year.

With all its futuristic technology, the F-22 may end up costing well over $ 100 million per aircraft. The total price tag--at least $ 98 billion up to 2012--makes the plane one of the most expensive weapons programs in the Pentagon's history. The question is, who, in the new era, will this superfighter be used against? Donald Rice, Secretary of the US Air Force, has asserted that "the F-22 is not designed for the threat of today, or even tomorrow, but to meet and defeat the threats of the 21st century". Yet what exactly are these threats? The Air Force has failed to answer this question satisfactorily.

At its start in the early 1980s, the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program was geared toward a single purpose: to counter the new fighters that the Soviet Union was expected to field in the mid-1990s. Now it seems clear that those enemy warplanes will never take to the skies. "Today we have no global challenger," said Dick Cheney, US Secretary of Defense in January. "The threats have become remote, so remote that they are difficult to discern." With the states of the former Soviet Union looking to the West for aid, and with no major rival to US power on the horizon, the case for taking a giant leap in fighter aircraft technology is hardly compelling. Still, despite its huge cost and now dated mission, the F-22 has encountered remarkably little flak in Congress. As things stand, the plane will almost certainly be built.

Prepared for the worst...

How can such a program, justified for years strictly on Cold War grounds, evade Capitol Hill's budget cutters and the Pentagon's watchdogs?

The survival of the F-22 can be explained largely by looking at the new politics of defense. That stance has been shaped in great part by two ideas put forth by the Pentagon's planners: first, that the US must maintain overwhelming technological superiority in the new era as a hedge against "uncertainty"--the revival of Russian power or the emergence of a new superpower; and second, that high-technology weapons like the F-22 will be needed to fight well-equipped Third World adversaries in the near future. This grim geopolitical logic has found a receptive audience in Washington DC. Pentagon warning of a "still dangerous world" have combined with the familiar dynamics of congressional "pork barrelling" (government spending directed at projects that will keep constituents happy) to salvage numerous arms programmes whose rationales disappeared along with the Soviet Union.

During the four decades of the Cold War, the US sought to exploit its technological edge to offset the Soviet Union's numerical advantage in weapons. The deployment of the F-15 fighter in the early 1970s is a case in point. The F-15 was, and still is, the most sophisticated fighter plane ever built. Its design incorporated all the advantages of a heavy multipurpose fighter--long combat range, large armaments loads, all-weather capability and the latest in electronics technology--without sacrificing aerial manoeuvrability. In the event of a war with the Soviet Union, the F-15's mission was to outfight swarms of less advanced Soviet aircraft.

Even as the F-15 assumed its place in the pantheon of fighter aircraft, Pentagon planners worried about its eventual obsolescence. In the early 1980s, Air Force officials warned that the Soviets were beginning to deploy aircraft comparable with the F-15 and F-16, a fighter-bomber, as part of an aggressive effort to achieve military superiority over the West. Future generations of Soviet fighters for the 1990s were expected to be even more capable. The Soviets were not only keeping their numerical edge, Keel said, but were now "narrowing the technology gap".

The ATF was the Air Force solution to these ominous trends. And from the beginning, the service had big plans for its new fighter. The Air Force imagined a design that combined an array of new technologies into a single aircraft. The plane would be a full generation more advanced than existing fighters, just as the F-15 had been when it was introduced.

For all that the ATF offered--speed, stealth, manoeuvrability--the Air Force promised a remarkably modest price tag. The final cost, officials predicted in 1986, would be roughly comparable with that of the F-15:$ 35 million a plane at 1984 rates. A long history of the Pentagon breaking projected budgets should have made Congress suspicious of this estimate. Yet few questions were raised about the cost during the free-spending 1980s.

As funding requests for the ATF increased over the course of the decade, Pentagon assessments of future Soviet aircraft became even bleaker. The next generation of Soviet fighters, due out by the mid-1990s "will have manoeuvering capability and fire control systems vastly superior to our most advanced F-15s and F-16s", predicted a top Air Force official in 1985. Just as ominously, the Air Force warned that the Soviets were perfecting their radar systems and beefing up their capabilities for managing battles, better enabling them to simultaneously track and attack numerous low-flying aircraft.

Even in the mid-1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and began his reform programm, the forward march of Soviet technology seemed to those in the US capital as dependable a feature of life as the spring brilliance of Washington's cherry blossoms. And because the development of the ATF was inextricably linked to this forward march, it was as much a Cold War weapons system as the B-2 stealth bomber or the MX missile, which are both unnecessarily sophisticated, and expensive, for the less threatening world of today. "The program schedule is driven by the threat," stated a 1987 Air Force document. Never once, through the 1980s, did the Air Force point to adversaries besides the Soviet Union to justify its development of a new fighter.

With its economy in shambles and its political system imploding, the Soviet Union was, by early 1990, no longer a viable contestant in the conventional military competition with the West. Nor, many suspected, could it be such a contestant again in the foreseeable future. In an historic testimony before Congress in March 1990, William Webster, director of the CIA, announced that the Soviet threat had permanently diminished. No alliance of former Soviet states of the near future would be likely "to seek a broad reversal of the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe, or try to revive the Warsaw Pact."

...and overestimating the enemy

It seems clear, in retrospect, that the Pentagon's assessment of the Soviet Union's future high-tech military prowess was at odds with growing evidence of its economic backwardness. In his 1980 book Bound to Lead, Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye suggested that "Soviet central planners lack the flexibility to keep up with the quickened pace of technological change in today's information-based economy. They have not come to terms with the third industrial revolution (electronics technology)." The worsening Soviet lag in science and technology was not as pronounced in some military areas, Nye wrote, but "in an age of 'smart weapons' that incorporate microchips and sensors, military technology increasingly depends on an advanced civilian electronics sector". Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post observed in his book on the end of the Cold War, The Turn, that in 1987 the Soviet Union was estimated to have only 200 000 microcomputers, many of them unsophisticated; whereas the US had over 25 million.

In 1990, even as Congress appropriated another billion dollars for the ATF, some of its members were beginning to question the need for a new fighter. Although the Senate Armed Services Committee approved the Air Force's budget for the 1991 fiscal year, it demanded that the Air Force examine alternatives to the ATF.

When alarm bells began to ring

The Air Force complied, running some 1200 hours of computer-simulated battles pitting the ATF and an advanced version of the F-15 against hypothetical Soviet fighters at the turn of the century. The findings, presented to Congress in early 1991, were predictable. "The study results show that the ATF is far more capable of achieving air superiority against the evolving threat," reported Major General Joseph Ralston, a top Air Force official. In arguing for a continuance of the ATF program, Ralston also fell back on the Air Force argument used to justify the fiasco surrounding the B-1 bomber, which was dogged by technical problems despite having billions of dollars spent on it: since $ 5 billion had already been spent on the ATF, Ralston said, it was wisest to press on rather than opt "for what is essentially a paper design of alternatives". Although the ATF remained years away from full-scale production, the Air Force argued that it was too late to stop the program.

Alarm bells were now sounding at the Congressional Budget Office. A CBO study conducted in 1991 (by which time the plane's price tag had doubled) raised serious doubts about the program's cost and necessity. "If history is a guide, the ATF could cost $ 100 million a piece or even $ 135 million," warned CBO analyst Robert Hale in his April testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. (By "history" he meant the cost increases that occurred in the programmes for the F-15 and F-4, the F-15's predecessor.) At such a high unit price, said Hale, the Air Force would have no hope of sustaining its planned post Cold War force of 26 tactical fighter wings (roughly, 2600 aircraft). Without sharply increased funding from Congress, which is highly unlikely in the 1990s, the Air Force would find itself with only 12 to 16 tactical fighter wings if it went forward with the ATF.

The CBO report also questioned the need for developing a new fighter plane now that the Cold War was ending. The Soviet Union's preoccupation with its own affairs, said Hale, "would drastically reduce the threats posed to US tactical air forces because the capabilities of potential adversaries other than the Soviet Union are much more modest". In light of a declining Soviet threat, the CBO believed that the US could probably meet its security needs by cancelling the ATF and upgrading existing fighter aircraft.

In December 1991 the already weak case for the ATF--now officially the F-22 after Lockheed's victory over Northrop--became even weaker with the final collapse of the Soviet Union. The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James Clapper, informed the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1992 that the military machine of the old Soviet Union was rapidly falling apart. Russia was cutting procurement of new weapons "by about 80 per cent", he said, and military research and development "may be reduced by as much as 30 per cent from last year".

Was revived Russian militarism a possibility in the near future? Cheney, long known as the cabinet member most wary about the "Soviet peril", feels that such a scenario is doubtful. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee in January that the GNP of the former Soviet Union had plummeted by 15 to 20 per cent in 1991 alone. "It is improbable," said Cheney, "that a global conventional challenge to US and Western security will re-emerge from the Eurasian heartland for years to come."

Changing circumstances have not deterred the F-22's proponents. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the Pentagon began to concoct a new rationale for American military power. Pentagon officials insisted that a continued large US military establishment would be needed to counter Third World challengers, as well as to promote worldwide stability and to cope with any new global military threat that might arise.

The Air Force took a lead role in refining this strategic concept. "The world of the 1990s and beyond is likely to be characterised by a combination of political instability, serious economic dislocation and widespread military power," the Air Force argued in a 1990 policy manifesto entitled Global Reach, Global Power. "The likelihood that US military forces will be called upon to defend US interests in a lethal environment is high, but the time and place are difficult to predict."

Without breaking stride, the Air Force began justifying the ATF within this new strategic paradigm. In March 1990 John Welch, former Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, said: "I believe that our research and development investment strategy must be looked at quite independently of a specific threat by a specific adversary." He added: "We must maintain technological superiority in an environment that is changing." Just because specific threats were currently unclear, Welch added, did not mean that the US should cancel weapons systems that "our grandchildren will probably operate". The Air Force insisted that the technology represented by the ATF program was a necessary hedge against uncertainty.

As the Pentagon itself has acknowledged, however, a prudent military R&D effort does not require full-scale production of the most advanced weapons systems. In January, Cheney told Congress that the US would hold off making many new armaments once test models had been designed and developed. This "prototyping" approach reflects the belief, held by all senior administration officials, that the US would have years of warning before a new global threat could arise.

The F-22 is precisely the kind of weapons system that can now be moved to the backburner, as has been suggested by mainstream defense analysts such as Gordon Adams, head of the Defense Budget Project, a non-profit group in Washington DC that is critical of Pentagon spending. If a new global threat emerges, the existing F-22 design would allow the US to begin full-scale production without facing a dangerous delay.

But to the Air Force, things are not so simple. Beyond citing the uncertainty of world politics and the possible emergence of a new superpower, the Air Force argues that the F-22 is needed to handle future Third World adversaries. "As weapons production becomes global, increasingly lethal weapons are available to smaller powers and regional states," warned a top Air Force general, Richard Hawley, four months before the Gulf crisis began in August 1989. "Third World battlefields will be in many ways as demanding as those we could expect in Central Europe."

The fear is not that the world's developing nations might produce jets to rival America's finest aircraft. Rather, Pentagon planners evidently worry that allies such as France, Britain or Germany will. In May 1991, for example, Rice warned that two Western fighters under development--the European Fighter Aircraft and the French Rafale--will be more advanced than the F-15 and F-16. Although the US is unlikely to find itself at war with its European friends, these new planes could conceivably be sold to Third World nations, much as advanced French Mirage fighters were sold to Iraq. The F-22 would safeguard US forces to prevail "anywhere any time against any threat", Rice told Congress in February 1992.

Pentagon leaders cite the Gulf War to buttress their case for continuing to push forward the frontiers of military technology. "Future adversaries may have ready access to advanced technologies and systems from the world arms market," warned Cheney in January. "The war showed that we must work to maintain the tremendous advantages that accrue from being a generation ahead in weapons technology."

But are future Third World threats--particularly in the realm of air power--as serious as the Pentagon claims?

Simple arithmetic suggests that they are not. The long-standing rationale for US efforts to field revolutionary jet fighters, including the ATF, was to overcome a numerical inferiority relative to the Soviet Union. Now, in making its post-Cold War pitch for the F-22, the Air Force has sought to keep this argument alive. In a September 1991 report, the service argued that offsetting large numbers of enemy aircraft with "smaller numbers of even more sophisticated and stealthy F-22s is not merely desirable, but mandatory, if America is to retain its air superiority in the potential combat environments of the future".

The trouble is, an air force to match that of the US in numbers is nowhere in sight. According to the 1991 CBO study, the US will maintain a considerable numerical lead over likely Third World adversaries such as North Korea or Cuba. "Even after the planned reduction in US forces to 26 wings, the US advantage would range from a low of 4 to 1 to a high of 16 to 1," CBO analyst Hale told Congress. And the US edge over potential Third World adversaries would always be tremendous given American advantages in intelligence, training and battle management--all so vividly displayed during the Gulf War.

Indeed, the real lesson of the Gulf War may be very different from what the Pentagon would have Congress and the public believe. Iraq, it was commonly said, had one of the finest integrated air defenses in the Third World. It also had a highly advanced air force, which boasted some of the best French- and Soviet-made fighters available. Yet this equipment proved nearly worthless in Iraqi hands. When war came, Iraq's air defenses crumbled, and its Air Force barely fought; US losses were negligible. Far from substantiating the Pentagon's grim assessment of future Third World threats, Desert Storm showed that even the best-equipped Third World military challengers are likely to lack the broader technological sophistication and training required to take on a Western power.

Bureaucratic momentum

Contending with future challengers will simply not require aircraft of the F-22's caliber. The US numerical edge over potential Third World adversaries, combined with myriad technological advantages, will assure air superiority with the current generation of fighters.

The continuation of the F-22 program, which next year alone will cost $ 2.2 billion, defies logic. Pentagon claims about the F-22's role in an uncertain environment have clearly swayed a cautious Congress. But as these claims are not altogether persuasive, it is hard to escape the conclusion that other factors may be pushing the F-22 forward. One such factor is almost certainly the bureaucratic and economic momentum that gathers behind any weapons program of this size. Less tangibly, the element of national pride may be at work. Although futuristic military machines like the F-22 cannot make up for economic losses in key areas of civilian high technology, they provide a comforting reminder of the industrial strength and technological know-how that the US can still muster. The high-tech wizardry of the Gulf War offered this kind of reassurance on a grand scale.

During a time of mounting American self-doubt, a big attraction of the F-22 to the Bush administration and Congress may be its symbolic value; the aircraft is evidence that America can still win at something, and it signifies US resolve to stay pre-eminent in at least one category of national power. As global economic competition intensifies, however, Washington's attachment to futuristic military technology grows ever more costly.

Ultimately, the strongest case for the F-22 is that it represents an insurance policy of sorts: America should invest in this fighter on the slim chance that the world could turn very dangerous very quickly, and threaten US interests. But like any consumer, the US government can never have an infinite amount of insurance. It must shop wisely, seeking the most affordable policy to cover the most likely eventualities. By these criteria the F-22 is a bad buy.